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BOOK REVIEWS
THE FuND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS: VOLUME II.

By Joseph

Gold. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1982. pp.
xii, 499.
Reviewed by Whitney Debevoise*
Sir Joseph Gold may be a prophet without honor in his own
country. He has dedicated his professional life1 to the International Monetary Fund (the Fund) and to the principles established in the Bretton Woods Agreement.2 He has written extensively on the Fund and its workings,3 including his most recent
work, The Fund Agreement in the Courts: Volume IL Although
Gold speaks with an expertise achieved through more than a
quarter century of effort, courts do not always listen. In fact, English and United States courts have rejected Gold's position on
some key issues.4 All is not lost, however, because there are
projects described below that could be undertaken to vindicate
Gold's views.
*Attorney at Law, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C. J.D. 1977, Harvard
University; B.A. 1974, Yale University.
1. Gold was a staff member of the Legal Department of the International
Monetary Fund from October 1946 to July 1959. From 1960 to 1979, he served
as General Counsel of the Fund and Director of its Legal Department.
2. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945,
60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (amended by 20 U.S.T. 2775,
T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 726 U.N.T.S. 266 (May 31, 1968); 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No.
8937 (Apr. 30, 1978)) [hereinafter the Fund Articles].
3. E.g., J. GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS (1979); J. GOLD, MEMBERSHIP AND NONMEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND:

A

STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL

LAw Am ORGANIZATION (1974); J. GOLD, VOTING AND DECISIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: AN ESSAY ON THE LAw AND PRACTICE OF THE FUND

(1972).
4. E.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp.
870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); J. Zeevi and Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd.,
37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866
(1975); Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 1009, aff'd,
[1976] 1 Q.B. 683 (C.A.).
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The Fund Agreement in the Courts: Volume II,' like its predecessor volume,6 consists of a collection of essays describing and
discussing worldwide litigation involving issues arising under the
Bretton Woods Agreement. Eleven chapters of the book were previously published, some as long ago as the 1960s, in either the
Fund's Pamphlet Series or its periodical Staff Papers.7 Because
Gold had no control over either the issues raised by the parties or

their choice of forum in the litigation discussed, he could not suggest a neat organizing principle. Much of the private litigation in-

volving the Fund Agreement, however, has dealt with article VIII,
section 2(b). This coincidence has enabled Gold to organize many

of his articles around this provision.'
The major new contribution in Volume II is a chapter addressing article VIII, section 2(b) and the United States freeze of Ira-

5. J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS: VOLUME II (1982).
6. J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS (1962).
7. The rationale for republishing the previously written articles in book form
is to make access to the materials more convenient for litigants and scholars.
The benefit to litigants is mixed. They seldom would have time to penetrate the
full 499 pages of Volume II, and more cross references are therefore required.
For example, the reader does not learn until Chapter 3 that the Philippine Supreme Court had decided an appeal of a case discussed in Chapter 1. On the
other hand, because Gold's positions on key issues are frequently repeated
throughout the volume and conveniently restated in periodic summaries of principles or conclusions, a litigator looking for a legal theory could benefit from a
five minute perusal of the volume.
8. Chapters 1 through 4 and 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12, as well as three of the four
appendices deal, in whole or in part, with aspects of article VIII, section 2(b).
This provision reads in relevant part: "(b) Exchange contracts which involve the
currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement
shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member."
Chapters 5, 7, and 10 discuss problems in the application of exchange rates,
including the definition of a devaluation, the existence and nonexistence of par
values under the Second Amendment to the Fund Articles, and the meaning of
the expression "the least depreciated currency" in the Agreement on German
External Debt, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, T.I.A.S. No. 2792, 33 U.N.T.S. 4.
Appendix B focuses on the problem of applying units of account defined in
terms of gold. Some aspects of this issue are currently before United States
courts, most notably in Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 52 U.S.L.W. 4445 (Apr. 17, 1984) (Nos. 82-1186,
82-1465). The Supreme Court's recent decision is not likely to resolve the issue
of how to fix a truly international standard to limit airline liability under the
Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
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nian assets.' The chapter describes the United States executive
orders 10 and regulations"" at issue in the suits brought in France
and England by Bank Markazi, the Iranian Central Bank, against
foreign branches of United States banks for the return of monies
deposited with those branches.12 Acting on instructions from their
home offices in the United States, the foreign branches refused to
return the deposits, claiming that United States asset controls
barred repayment.
The defendant banks raised article VIII, section 2(b) as a defense to the actions brought in London, noting that the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Iran were all members of the
Fund and that, under the Bretton Woods Agreements Order,
1946, the courts of the United Kingdom must apply article VIII,
section 2(b) and find that the United States regulations had rendered the deposit contracts unenforceable. 13 The Iranian plaintiff
argued against this interpretation on the following technical
grounds: the deposit contracts were not "exchange contracts;" the
currency of the United States was not "involved;" and the imposition of the United States asset freeze was inconsistent with the
Articles.
A threshold issue connected to the article VIII, section 2(b) defense was whether the United States had jurisdiction to adopt the
regulations freezing the Iranian assets. In his discussion, Gold follows the safe approach of the consummate international servant.
Because the Fund has not decided the correct approach for determining the meaning of "legislative jurisdiction" under article
VIII, section 2(b),15 Gold expresses no preference. Gold's boldest

9. J. GOLD, supra note 5, at 360.
10. Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980); Exec. Order No.

12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979).
11. The Iranian Assets Control Regulations have been codified in 31 C.F.R. §
535 (1982).
12.

J. GOLD, supra note 5, at 370-76.

13. Id. at 373.
14. Id.
15. Gold identifies three approaches for determining the meaning of legislative jurisdiction under article VII, section 2(b):
The interpretation can be made in accordance with:
(i) general principles of legislative jurisdiction recognized by public international law, without reference to the Articles; or
(ii) the conclusion that a new principle of legislative jurisdiction is im-

plicit in the concept of the involvement of a currency under article VIII,
section 2(b) and that this principle replaces general principles of public
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statement on this issue is that it may be desirable in the future to
reexamine the traditional principles of legislative jurisdiction in
relation to banking."6
Gold's reluctance to comment on the legislative jurisdiction issue is understandable but unfortunate. By his unwillingness to
search for an answer, Gold misses an opportunity to ask the difficult questions that might allow the Fund to confront some of the
crucial issues on the agenda of the 1980s. For example, what
should happen when the competing exchange controls of two nations clash in the courts of a third country? Suppose that for
financial reasons unrelated to the taking of hostages at the United
States Embassy in Tehran, Iranian authorities had ordered that
all certificates of deposit in hard currencies held by Iranian entities be withdrawn and the funds returned to Iran. Suppose further that the amount of the Iranian deposits was sufficient to give
the United States cause for concern about the stability of the international banking system. Should an English court resolve this
conflict in a suit for repayment of overseas deposits that are allegedly blocked by a United States asset freeze?
The courts of England might be an appropriate forum for the
suit itself, but surely the Fund should be heard on the key issue. 17
In fact, the Fund has established a procedure for determining its
jurisdiction in alleged national and international security cases in
Executive Board Decision No. 144-(52/51).18 The Fund should be

bold in the use of this procedure, especially in cases in which the
security of the international monetary system itself is in question.' 9 If the Fund is incompetent or unwilling for political reainternational law on jurisdiction for the purpose of article VIII, section
2(b); or
(iii) the concept of the involvement of a currency under article VIII,
section 2(b), which concept is to be defined in accordance with general
principles of international law on legislative jurisdiction.
Id. at 377-78, 424-25.
16. Id. at 391. This statement appears in the context of a discussion of the
Concordat produced in 1975 by the Cooke Commission, as the Bank for Interna-

tional Settlements Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices is known. The recent difficulties involving the allocation of responsibilities
in the Banco Ambrosiano affair suggest that the time for reexamination has
come. See InternationalLending Rules Evolve, Am. Banker, July 27, 1983, at 79

(describing Concordat II and evasion of lender of last resort issue).
J. GOLD, supra note 5, at 424.
18. Decision No. 144-(52/51), reprinted in J. GOLD, supra note 5, at 366-67.
19. This would also be consistent with Fund Decision No. 446-4 of June 10,
17.
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sons to speak on this issue, there must be few cases in which it

could speak.
Once the Fund has decided a case under Decision No. 144-(52/
51), the national court should consider the decision and its reasoning in its own "real state interests"20 analysis. This analysis
not only eschews a system of rigid rules that often engender extraterritorial conflict, but also is consistent with the emerging
trend in solving significant international problems.21
After dealing with the threshhold jurisdictional issue in the Iranian cases, Gold addresses the nuts and bolts issues associated
with most article VIII, section 2(b) cases, such as "exchange contracts," "involve the currency," "exchange control regulations,"
and "maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement."
Gold's treatment of these issues is most assertive. The Fund has
clear views on these issues, and Gold's task is to refute all heresies and maintain the purity of the Fund's viewpoint. 22 For example, Gold restates the argument for the broad interpretation of
the phrase "exchange contracts" and the economic view of the
currency "involved" under article VIII, section 2(b). Gold also rejects motive as a factor in determining whether restrictions on
payments are "exchange control regulations" which 2' are
"main3
tained or imposed consistently with this Agreement.
The problem with these views is that courts, especially in countries with a common law tradition, have not always accepted
1949, reprinted in J. GOLD, supra note 5, at 94, which underlines Gold's suggestion that, when asked, the Fund should advise national courts whether exchange
controls are "maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement." Id.
20. This phrase is used by Lowenfeld to describe the international analog to
domestic interest analysis in the conflict of laws. See Lowenfeld, Extraterritoriality: Conflict and Overlap in National and International Regulation, Ari.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 30, 33-34 (1981) (proceedings of the 74th Annual Meeting).
21. The conflict over United States export controls on items destined for the
Yamal gas pipeline was resolved in negotiations that turned on a frank evaluation of "real state interests." See Burns; Economic Health of the Western Alliance, reprintedin U.S. DEPARTmENT OF STATE, CURRENT POLIcY No. 445 (Dec. 9,
1982). Cf. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976).
22. Chapter 12 is entitled "The Articles of Agreement and the U.S. Freeze of
Assets, November 1979 Views of Courts and Others on Legal Aspects Relating to
Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund's Articles." As this title suggests, the
chapter largely consists of a statement and exegesis of others' views on the Fund
articles in the context of the Iranian asset freeze.
23. J. GOLD, supra note 5, at 393-418, 424-27.
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If this problem is not addressed, there is a risk that the
Fund may turn into little more than a development lending
institution.
The world is currently confronted with the so-called international debt crisis. More than thirty nations have faced the need to
restructure external obligations.25 What role have article VIII,
section 2(b) and the Fund played to date? Primarily, the Fund
has assisted in the elaboration of economic adjustment programs
and has provided member countries with additional funds. In an
important departure from prior practice, the Fund no longer insists that a member country curtail external borrowings as a condition of access to the Fund's resources. In many cases, an agreement with the member's creditors to make new funds available is
a precondition to the availability of Fund resources. 26 The availability of Fund resources, in turn, has become a standard precondition to the availability of private resources. 27 The net result is
that an agreement with the Fund on an economic adjustment program is crucial to the success of almost any current refinancing
effort.
Reaching agreement with the Fund takes time. The Fund itself
has certain routine, time-consuming procedures. In addition, the
press of business at the Fund limits the flexibility in the schedules of key staff personnel in all but the most important cases.
Social and political pressures in the member country also may affect the timing of both the development and the implementation
of an adequate adjustment program.
In the interim period prior to a refinancing, article VIII, section
2(b) could play a very important role. Yet, because United States
courts have resisted Gold's views on the application of article
VIII, section 2(b), the provision has not realized its full potential.
Consider the following cases involving the Costa Rican refinancing. In 1981 Costa Rica perceived the need to control its foreign
them.

24. E.g., supra note 4.
25. See, e.g., Mendez, Recent Trends in CommercialBank Lending to LDCs:
Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 173
(1982); Cohen, U.S. Regulation of Bank Lending to LDCs: Balancing Bank
Overexposure and Capital Undersupply, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 200,
201-07 (1982).
26. E.g., IMF Plans Pressure on Banks to Help Brazil, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15,
1982, at D3, col. 1.
27.

E.g., 3 Latin Debtor Nations in Talks With Creditors,N.Y. Times, Aug.

13, 1983, at 40, col. 5.
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exchange and refinance its external debt. To promote these goals,
decrees were issued prohibiting external payments without Central Bank approval. When these approvals were not given and the
required payments were missed, several credit syndicates that
were unwilling to await the Costa Rican refinancing broke ranks
and brought suit in New York. In Libra Bank Limited v. Banco
Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A.,2 s the defendants asserted an act of
state defense and an article VIII, section 2(b) defense, both of
which failed. In Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago,29 the act of state defense succeeded. From
Gold's perspective, both cases must be riddled with intellectual
impurities.
Gold and others have argued that article VIII, section 2(b)
should preempt the act of state doctrine when a defense to nonpayment depends on the foreign exchange controls of a Fund
member.30 Article VIII, section 2(b) is part of a binding United
States treaty obligation and therefore falls within an exception to
the act of state doctrine acknowledged in Sabbatino31 In addition, article VIII, section 2(b) stands as a significant expression of
the United States policy favoring recognition of foreign exchange
controls. The act of state doctrine, therefore, should never have
arisen in the Costa Rican cases.2
28. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
29. Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F.
Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, No. 83-7714 (2d Cir., Apr. 23, 1984). A petition for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing en banc are currently pending.
30. J. GOLD, supra note 5, at 138-39; Williams, ExtraterritorialEnforcement
of Exchange Control Regulations Under the International Monetary Fund
Agreement, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 319, 387-94 (1975).
31. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
32. It is interesting, nevertheless, to observe the different approaches of the

two cases to the act of state defense. In Libra Bank, the judge found that the
Costa Rican exchange control measures were confiscatory and extraterritorial

and, therefore, not within the ambit of the act of state doctrine. 570 F. Supp. at
882-83. Gold might quibble with both conclusions. See J. GOLD, supra note 5, at
139, 391; cf. Serbian Loans Case, 1929 P.C.I.J., ser. A, Nos. 20/21, at 44 (generally accepted principle that a state is entitled to regulate its own currency).

In Allied Bank, the court found that Costa Rica adopted the exchange control
measures in response to a serious national economic crisis. A judicial determina-

tion that defendants must make payments contrary to the directives of their
government would place the judicial branch of the United States at odds with
the policies a foreign government formulated on an issue of central importance.
The resulting risk of embarrassment to the relations with the Executive Branch
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The Libra Bank decision on article VIII, section 2(b) expressly
rejected the argument that the international loan agreements in
question were "exchange contracts." The court also rejected
Gold's position that exchange controls arising during the life of a
contract could make it unenforceable.3 3 Finally, the court held
that the defendant had not demonstrated that the currency regulations were imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement. 4
United States and British judges seem impelled to adopt the
narrow view of the phrase "exchange contracts"35 because the
Bretton Woods ,Agreement was drafted in the context of a par
value system. To support this system, contracts for the exchange
of currency had to be policed on both the national and international levels. Gold suggests in Appendix A, which discusses the
evidence found in Lord Keynes' collected writings on the drafting
history of the provision,3" that the prime concern behind article
VIII, section 2(b) was the exchange rate for transactions in third
countries.3 7 A loan contract would not invoke this concern because it would create an obligation to repay in one or more specified currencies without setting a rate of conversion at the time of
repayment.38
Whether this argument is right or wrong, it obviously troubles
some judges. Rather than trying to overturn the narrow interpretation by producing more critical commentary,3 9 perhaps scholars
and the government of Costa Rica justified recognition of the act of state defense. 566 F. Supp. at 1442-43. The Second Circuit based its affirmance on the
doctrine of comity.
33. J. GOLD, supra note 5, at 140-41.
34. Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 896-902.
35. E.g., J. Zeevi & Sons Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y. 2d
220, 333 N.E.2d 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Banco
do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 235, 239
N.Y.S.2d 872 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964); Wilson, Smithett & Cope
Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 Q.B. 683 (C.A.).
36. 26 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: AcTivrrms
1941-1946, SHAPING THE POST-WAR WORLD, BRETTON WOODS AND REPARATIONS
(D. Moggridge ed. 1980).
37. J. GOLD, supra note 5, at 429, 438.
38. Cf. Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 57 N.Y.2d 315,
442 N.E.2d 1195, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1982).
39.

Although one commentator on the Iranian asset controls cited "opinions

of legal advisers to international agencies," J. GOLD, supra note 5, at 381, as
authority for the validity of the controls under international law, these opinions
are not one of the sources of international law codified in article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), or a source to
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in this field should develop and propose amendments to article
VIH, section 2(b) to clarify the point. In the process, they could
also consider the larger structural problem raised by the Costa
Rican cases.
In Libra Bank, the defendant could not sustain its burden of
proving that the Costa Rican exchange controls were maintained
or imposed consistently with the Articles because there was no
showing of Fund approval. 40 Gold argues in Chapter 11 that the
only safe course in these circumstances is for the court to seek the
advice of the Fund.4 1 This procedure certainly is preferable to the
Libra Bank approach of determining the issue solely by examining the text of the Fund Articles. On the other hand, seeking the
Fund's advice may not go far enough.
In most legal systems, a private concern may seek the protection of the courts to reorganize when it encounters liquidity
problems.42 Yet, when a sovereign debtor faces the same problem,
no comparable institution exists. The government must request
the deferral of principal payments and seek the cooperation of
many creditors worldwide. A single lawsuit by a nonconforming
creditor, however, can upset the tenuous balance. The debtor
country, usually in the form of a state-owned corporation, bank,
or development institution, then must rely on the uncertain act of
state or article VIII, section 2(b) defenses. In short, the process is
unlikely to produce uniform decisions within a single judicial system, much less across national borders.
The time is ripe to develop a proposal for a Fund mechanism
analogous to Chapter 11 of the United States bankruptcy law.
The advantage for member countries would be a formal mechanism for temporary interruption of principal payments (not interest). The advantage for creditor countries would be that a single
bank could not promote its interests ahead of the interests of
other creditors 43 and the international financial system. The
mechanism could be made available upon application by a member country. The Fund would then consider the application in
light of certain basic requirements (for example, that exchange
which domestic courts are likely to give dispositive weight, especially in the face
of countervailing precedents.
40. Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 901-02.
41. J. GOLD, supra note 5, at 358.
42. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1129 (1982) (reorganization).

43. Cf. 22 U.S.C. § 286e(8) (Supp. V 1981).
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controls be nondiscriminatory), and certify that the applicant
qualified for the benefits of the program. One of these benefits
would be that the member country's failure to pay principal on
defined external indebtedness would be excused temporarily by
domestic tribunals. Another benefit might include technical assistance with the establishment of accurate debt statistics. The program would have to be temporary and linked in some fashion to
negotiations concerning an economic adjustment program. In addition, a member country would remain free to opt out at any
point.
The foregoing outline provides only a peek at what such a Fund
program would involve; further refinement of the proposal is not
only required, but desirable, so that Gold will not remain forever
a prophet without honor in the courts of England and the United
States. For any who undertake the project, the mandatory starting point and invaluable resource will be The Fund Agreement in
the Courts: Volume I.

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES. 1982 ICHIGAN
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES. New York: Clark

Boardman Co., 1982. Pp. xii, 646. $55.00.
Reviewed by Roger S. Clark*
This is one of the few times that this reviewer has read a yearbook symposium issue from cover to cover. Much in this volume
is new, provocative, and well-stated. It should be obligatory reading for anyone with a professional interest in the law, politics, or
the organizational structure of the international community's response to one of the great human rights problems of our time. A
brief description of the content of the Yearbook and a detailed
review of the contributors' articles will give some indication of its
ambitious scope.

Part one of TransnationalLegal Problems of Refugees, "Refugees in International Law and Organization," 1 contains three
chapters. James L. Carlin's article, Significant Refugee Crises

Since World War 11 and the Response of the InternationalCommunity,2 emphasizes the global nature of the refugee problem.

Europe has been the traditional focus of concern and remains a
continuing source of refugees. The decolonization process and assorted Third World crises have also contributed to the number of
refugees. The turmoil in the Horn of Africa, the birth of Pakistan
and Bangladesh, and the mass exodus from Southeast Asia are
current refugee sources. The refugee problem is global and continuing, even if the organized international community would like
to pretend otherwise.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)s has touched the lives of millions of people; its interventions often spell the difference between life and death. Very
little, however, has been written on the High Commissioner's Office other than that written by current or former officials of the
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers, The State University of New
Jersey School of Law, Camden.
1. 1982 McH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1 [hereinafter cited as YEARBOOK].
2. Carlin, Significant Refugee Crises Since World War IT and the Response
of the InternationalCommunity, in id. at 3.
3. Clark, Human Rights and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, 10 INT'L J. LEGAL INFo. 287 (1982).
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Office itself.4 The second article in Part one by Paul Weis 5, The
Development of Refugee Law,6 is an excellent contribution to this
genre. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill's article, entitled Entry and Exclusion of Refugees: The Obligations of States and the Protection
Functionof the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, 7 appears in Part five of the volume. Although both
authors have spent many years dealing with some of the world's
most depressing problems, they have retained their spirit of optimism in the articles. Both start from the same basic point: in
traditional international law, people have looked to their state of
origin for the protection of their basic interests. A whole body of
human rights law on the protection of aliens has evolved as states
have processed their citizens' claims against other sovereigns.
What happens, however, if the state of origin is the source of the
evil? Who protects the victims?
One response to the problem of protecting individual rights was
the creation of the High Commissioner's Office during the League
of Nations era. This office was recreated as the UNHCR. Like
much of the international community's human rights efforts, this
was an ad hoc solution to the problem. The High Commissioner's
Office was established over the opposition of a significant part of
the United Nations membership and was intended to operate on
a temporary, facilitative basis. The organization was designed to
catalyze the work of states, and especially the voluntary nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which were charged with the
day-to-day care and resettlement of refugees within the High
Commissioner's mandate.8 Although the UNHCR has been
granted numerous "life" extensions and has experienced several
4. See, e.g., J. Read, The United Nations and Refugees-Changing Con-

cepts, 1962 INT'L CONCMMUTION No. 537; Aga Khan, Legal Problems Relating to
Refugees and Displaced Persons, 149
RECUEIL DES COURs

5.
tions
6.
27.
7.

AcADnMIE

DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL,

287 (1976).

Paul Weis is the former Director of the Legal Division of the United NaHigh Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
Weis, The Development of Refugee Law, in YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at
Goodwin-Gill, Entry and Exclusion of Refugees: The Obligations of

States and the Protection Function of the Office of The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, in YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 291. Mr. GoodwinGill is currently Legal Advisor and Protection Officer of the United Nations

High Commission for Refugees.
8. Id. at 292-94.
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refugee-generating crises since its inception, the problem of resettlement remains unsolved. The UNHCR has been forced to expand its operating budget by a large amount and change to an
operational orientation. Through creeping jurisdictional expansions,9 new classes of clients, including those within the "good offices" regime of the High Commissioner and those "displaced persons" for whom the UNHCR has a "concern," 10 have been drawn
into the UNHCR's net.
Weis deals primarily with the High Commissioner's symbolic
tools: the principles of asylum and nonrefoulement. Nonrefoulement is the principle that a refugee should not be returned to a
country where his life or liberty may be endangered. Weis traces
the origin of the United Nations refugee efforts to the large volume of refugees generated by the Russian Revolution, the post1951 treaties signed under the aegis of the United Nations, and
the regional treaties aimed at the refugee problem. Using examples drawn from several nations, he discusses "a distinct trend in
the legislation of many countries in the past decades, to take into
account, to an ever-increasing degree, the special position of refugees." 11 Although the 1977 Conference of Plenipotentiaries did
not result in an agreement on the text of a convention on territorial asylum, Weis perceives a promising, although nascent, trend
in recent efforts toward the recognition of something approaching
a "right" to asylum in some domestic systems.1 2
Zvi Gitelman concludes Part one with a chapter entitled Exiting from the Soviet Union: Emigrks or Refugees?-" This very de-

9. See, e.g., Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
ch. 1(1), G.A. Res. 428(V) Annex, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc.
A/1775/Corr. 1 (1950).
10. The UNHCR has expanded its sphere of activity without any formal
amendment of its constituent document. See id. The Economic and Social
Council and the General Assembly have gradually expanded the Statute. See
infra note 11. Their expansive determinations have occurred either because the
High Commissioner was asked to take some action in response to a crisis or
because the Commissioner acted and sought ratification afterwards. High Commissioners have shared a determined creativity in both expanding their turf and
in their actions as eternal scroungers. See id.; see also UNHCR General Information Paper Annex M, U.N. Doc. HCR/50B/1/82. Note the dramatic expansion of the operating budget of the office from $5,521,000 in 1965 to $496,956,000
in 1980. Id.
11. Weis, supra note 5, at 33. See generally Aga Khan, supra note 4.
12. Weis, supra note 5, at 37-39.
13. Gitelman, Exiting from the Soviet Union: Emigrgs or Refugees?, in
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tailed article does not readily fit into what is otherwise a more
general overview. Gitelman attempts to address the difficult question of who is a refugee and thus entitled to particular kinds of
treatment and placement. Unfortunately, Gitelman does not
make his points clearly and leaves the reader somewhat unsure
about his analysis.
Part two, entitled "Entering the Country of Refuge: National
Law and Policy on Refugee Entry and Resettlement,

'14

contains

only one article. In Refugees and Refugee Law in a World of
Transition,5 Atle Grahl-Madsen gives a depressing assessment
that national laws do not facilitate the resettlement of refugees.
The author's conclusion is supported by the synopses of state
practices contained in the Appendix to the book. 6 Grahl-Madsen
believes that the national response to refugee problems has been
inadequate; as more and more refugees are generated, many countries, even first-haven nations, are making narrow, legalistic decisions that deprive refugees of the chance for a new start. At the
international community level, he sees an "organizational tangle '1 7 in the refugee situation. To untangle the problems, he advocates that the work of the UNHCR, which has humanitarian
responsibilities for victims of man-made disasters, should be coordinated with the work of the Office of United Nations Disaster
Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), 8 an organization with logistical responsibilities for victims of natural disasters. A clear division of
responsibilities between the organizations would prevent an overlap of functions and ensure an effective and efficient response to
the needs of disaster victims.19
Part three, "Entering the Country of Refuge: United States
YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 43.

14. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 63.
15. Grahl-Madsen, Refugees and Refugee Law in a World in Transition, in
id. at 65.
16. Review of Foreign Laws, in YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 551 (app. III).
17. Grahl-Madsen, supra note 15, at 79-83.
18. Id. at 81. UNDRO was formed by the General Assembly in 1971. G.A.
Res. 2816, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 85, U.N. Doc. A/Res/2816 (1971).
Initially it was restricted in its activities to mobilizing only United Nations assistance. Since 1982 it has been empowered to mobilize aid from other quarters
as well. G.A. Res. 144, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 117, U.N. Doc. A/37/51
(1982); see UNDRO News, March/April 1983 at 1.
19. Grahl-Madsen, supra note 15, at 84.
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Perspectives,

20

contains six discussions of various aspects of

United States law and policy of vital importance because the
"United States, for political and humanitarian reasons, has accepted for admission and resettlement, and ultimately citizenship,
more refugees than any other nation. ' 21 David Martin's chapter,
The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future,2 2 is a particularly
useful tool for understanding the United States position. It provides a very sensitive examination of United States refugee legislation and highlights a major flaw in the Refugee Act of 198023
dramatically revealed in the recent Cuban and Haitian refugee
cases. Although the Act generally covers the admission of refugees
into the United States,
[s]cant [legislative] attention was directed, however, to the other
half of the issue, the problem of asylum: how shall the United
States treat people who reach the country's shores on their own
and then claim to be refugees, entitled to all the protections international law provides, most particularly to protection against expulsion to their homelands? 2
Norman L. Zucker's article, Refugee, Resettlement in the
United States: The Role of the Voluntary Agencies,2" is particularly interesting. Although voluntary agencies play an enormous
role in the refugee area on both the international and the national
levels, very little scholarly literature has analyzed their roles.
Zucker's chapter is the best overview discussion of this topic
known to the reviewer.
Part four, "Entering the Country of Refuge: Comparative Perspectives, ' 26 could have been combined with Part two. In the first
of two essays, Nordic Refugee Law and Policy,27 Dr. Goran Melander discusses the extent to which the Nordic countries' contributions to the solution of the refugee problem have been disproportionate to their size. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Nordic
20. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 89.
21. Zucker, Refugee Resettlement in the United States: The Role of the
Voluntary Agencies, in id. at 155.
22. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, in YEARBOOK,
supra note 1, at 91.
23. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 22 U.S.C.).
24. Martin, supra note 22, at 91.
25. Zucker, supra note 21.
26. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 227.
27. Melander, Nordic Refugee Law and Policy, in id. at 229.
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countries went to great pains to permit permanent resettlement
of European refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, when the largest
problems related to non-European refugees, these countries made
generous financial contributions to the operating budget of the
UNHCR. 28 Peter Nobel, one of the most prolific writers on African refugee problems, provides a sobering picture of the magnitude of the refugee problem in the second essay of Part four. 9 He
examines the effect of the generous interpretation of the term
"refugee" by the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention30 and places the African response in the context
of the very productive 1979 Conference on "The Situation of Refugees in Africa." '
Part five, "Entering the Country of Refuge: International Perspectives," 32 contains two chapters. The first is by Guy S. Goodwin-Gill; 33 the second, by Stephen B. Young, is entitled Between
Sovereigns: A Reexamination of the Refugee's Status.-4
Goodwin-Gill touches on some of the same themes as Weis, but
is much more forceful in advocating the view, often espoused by
the UNHCR, that nonrefoulement is an obligation of customary
international law and not merely a duty of those states that are
parties to treaties embodying the principle.3 He also argues for
an expansive interpretation of the doctrine, including an obliga-

28. See id.
29. Nobel, Refugees, Law, and Development in Africa, in YEARBOOK, supra
note 1, at 255.
30. Id. at 258. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, Organization for African Unity, art. I,
U.N.T.S. No. 14691, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 1288. Article I of the Convention uses

the familiar definition of "refugee" as one with a "well-founded" fear of persecution in his country of origin, id. art. I, para, 1, and continues, "The term 'refugee' shall also apply to every person who, owing to external agression [sic], occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either

part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to ...seek
refuge in another place .. . " id. art. I, para. 2. This expanded definition permits international action, including action by the UNHCR, for a wider class of
victims in Africa than elsewhere.

31. Nobel, supra note 29, at 259-60. For more information on the 1979 OAU
Conference, see materials cited in id. at 282 nn.21-25.
32. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 289.
33. Supra note 7; see supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
34. Young, Between Sovereigns: A Reexamination of the Refugee's Status,
in YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 339.

35. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 7, at 304-06.
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tion not to reject asylum seekers at the frontier. 6 Goodwin-Gill
discusses the crucial procedural problems that arise at the state
level when deciding asylum and refugee status cases.37 GoodwinGill posits that the involvement of the High Commissioner's Office in the process of defining refugee status in some countries
may enhance the integrity of the decision. 8
Surprisingly, Goodwin-Gill admires the procedures of the European Convention on Human Rights $1and seems to suggest that
UNHCR should emulate them. He notes that any contracting
state to the Convention may refer an alleged breach of the Convention by another party to the European Commission of Human
Rights. He states that "[t]he instrument itself thus provides for
the emergence of a 'European public order,' a regime in which all
states parties have a sufficient interest in the observance of the
European Convention's provisions to allow for the assertion of
claims.

' 40

He continues:

While there are similarities in the objectives of the European Convention and the refugee conventions-both call for certain standards of treatment to be accorded to certain groups of persons-the refugee conventions lack effective investigation,
adjudication, and enforcement procedures; they can hardly be considered to offer the same opportunity for judicial or quasi-judicial
solutions.41
Goodwin-Gill's article makes two important points. The first
relates to his comment that all states have a "sufficient interest"
or "standing" to raise complaints against the actions of fellow
treaty parties allegedly denying human rights. The procedures of
the Convention are an example of the very important dictum in
the Barcelona Traction Case,42 in which the International Court
of Justice asserted that some obligations are erga omnes.43 Goodwin-Gill states that:
36. See id. at 302, 304.
37. Id. at 306-20.
38. See id. at 319-22.
39. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-

doms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter cited as European
Convention].

40. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 7, at 321.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 321-22; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. 3.
43. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32.
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[I]t is tempting to invoke a dictum of [the Barcelona Traction decision] and to argue that, in view of the importance of the rights
involved, all states have an interest in their protection; and that
the UNHCR, by express agreement of some states and by the acquiescence of others, 4is the qualified representative of the "interna'
tional public order."
He makes this important point too cautiously. The very existence
of the High Commissioner recognizes the demise of the notion
that states are the only subjects of international law and the only
actors on the international scene. 45 The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees is a special kind of international organization with an international personality. It represents individuals and masses of individuals who have no other champion, as
well as representing the broader concerns of the international
community as a whole.
The second point in Goodwin-Gill's thesis is that the High
Commissioner's Office is not a quasi-court. The Office has factfinding functions but exercises them differently than courts or
46
other quasi-judicial bodies like the European Commission. Most
refugee issues are not solvable by judicial decisions. This does not
imply that complaint-type procedures are never useful in refugee
cases. For the most part, however, the problems of refugees require negotiated rather than litigated solutions. The UNHCR is
very much a negotiating office. To the extent Goodwin-Gill regrets that the High Commissioner's Office is not like the European or OAS Commission, he underestimates the strengths and
nature of the Office.
Stephen Young's article 47 makes a central, critical point.
Young's basic message synthesizes the theme of the book: refu-

44. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 7, at 322 (footnote omitted). The International

Court of Justice stated:
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a

State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising
vis-A-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very

nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance
of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in

their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32.

45. Id.
46. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 7, at 319-22.

47. Young, supra note 34.
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gees cannot rely upon their state of origin for protection. 48 This
conclusion raises significant questions. What organs of protection
can be substituted for the refugee's state of origin? In particular,
what symbolic and structural techniques can the international
community implement? The creation of the Office of the UNHCR
is one response. Moreover, in addition to the few specialized treaties on refugees, the general human rights norms articulated in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,49 the Covenants on
Human Rights, 50 and the regional Conventions on Human
Rights8 1 may also apply to refugee rights.52 To what extent can
the procedures devised in these instruments be used for refugee
problems? Finally, if the refugee has found asylum, can the domestic legal system of the refuge state be used to redress some of
the wrongs perpetrated in the state of origin?
Part six, the final section, deals with "Legal Remedies for Refugees." 5 3 Three of its chapters discuss judicial remedies in the
United States legal system; 54 the other two chapters address regional human rights procedures that help resolve some of the
problems of refugees.5 5 Both Schneebaum and Tigar examine
cases illustrating the use of the legal system of the state in which

48. Id. at 339.
49. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948), reprinted in Y.B. of the

U.N. 1948-49, at 535-37.
50. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, id. at 52.
51. European Convention, supra note 39; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, reprintedin 9 I.L.M. 99 (1970); Organization of African Unity, Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June
1981, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
52. See generally C. NORGAARD,THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1962); Tucker, Has the Individual Become the Subject of Interna-

tional Law? 34 U. CIN. L. REv. 341 (1965).
53. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 371.
54. Schneebaum, Legal Rights of Refugees: Two Case Studies and Some
Proposalsfor a Strategy, in id., at 373; Malloy, The Impact of U.S. Control of
Foreign Assets on Refugees and Expatriates,in YEARBOOK,supra note 1, at 399;
Tigar, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Pursued Refugee: Lessons from Letelier v. Chile, in YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 421.
55. Young-Anawaty, InternationalHuman Rights Forums: A Means of Recourse for Refugees, in YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 451; Nance, The Individual
Right to Asylum Under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, in YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 477.
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the refugee is located to protect the refugee." s
Schneebaum's article analyzes the Filartigav. Peia-Iraladecision.57 Seventeen-year-old Joelito Filartiga was tortured to death
under the auspices of Pefia-Irala, Inspector-General of the
Paraguayan police in Asunci6n. His father had openly disagreed
with the policies of Paraguay's dictator, General Stroessner. More
than two years after Joelito's death, his sister, then a resident of
the United States, discovered that Pefia-Irala was illegally living
in the United States. She instituted proceedings on behalf of her
father and herself for Joelito's wrongful death. This claim,
brought in federal district court, alleged that the court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act,""
which gives district courts original jurisdiction "of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.

' 59

The District Court for

the Eastern District of New York dismissed the suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that torture constitutes a tort under the law of
nations and that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain
the action. 0

56. In the aftermath of the Nazi Holocaust, efforts to use the domestic legal
system of safe haven to obtain redress were initiated. In Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), mandate amended, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954), a Jewish refugee, who had settled in the United States, sought to recover
from an assignee property taken pursuant to German law because of his Jewish
status. The Second Circuit, applying the act of state doctrine, initially refused to
rule on the Nazi statute. Id., 173 F.2d at 71. After receiving a letter from the
State Department stating that the Executive Branch did not object to the
court's considering the validity of the German statute under international law,
the court reconsidered its position and proceeded to a trial on the merits. Id.,
210 F.2d at 375. The case was subsequently settled. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1955,
at 80, col. 8.
57. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Schneebaum, supra note 54, at 374-76.
Schneebaum served as counsel to three parties filing amicus curiae briefs. Id. at
373 (biographical footnote). For discussions of Filartiga,see Blum & Steinhardt,
Federal JurisdictionOver InternationalHuman Rights Claims: The Alien Tort
Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981); Claude,
The Case of Joelito Fildrtiga and the Clinic of Hope, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 275
(1983).
58. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878-79; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
60. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878. See Schneebauim, supra note 54, at 375-76. A
default judgment was entered for $375,000. Gold, Paraguayans Fight Back,
Aided by Obscure U.S. Law, Phila. Inquirer, May 17, 1983, at A2, col. 1. Pefia-
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Michael Tigar discusses Letelier v. Republic of Chile l in his
article. 2 The Letelier case arose from another disturbing phenomenon, the murder of opponents of authoritarian regimes on
foreign soil.6 s Letelier, former ambassador of the Allende Government to the United States, was killed in Washington, D.C. by a
bomb planted in his car. The bomb was detonated by members of
the Cuban Nationalist Movement acting on behalf of the Chilean
secret police agency, DINA. The Letelier family successfully
brought a civil suit in federal district court. In addition to an action for battery and wrongful death under District of Columbia
law, the family asserted tort claims based on the violation of statutory duty and tortious conduct in violation of international
64

law.

The plaintiffs relied on a federal criminal statute, section 1116
of the Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official
Guests, as a basis for their claim of breach of statutory duty. This
section provides that:
(a) Whoever kills or attempts to kill a foreign official, official
guest, or internationally protected person shall be punished as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title, except that
any such person who is found guilty of murder in the first degree
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life ... .15
A "foreign official" includes an "Ambassador, Foreign Minister
• . or any person who has previously served in such capacity."6
As a former Ambassador, Letelier was within this definition. Fundamental international principles of human rights and norms that
prohibit the transnational use of force except for defensive purIrala has left the United States, so prospects for collection are dim. Neverthe-

less, the psychological significance of the award as a vindication of the Filartiga
family's rights remains.

61. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
62. Tigar, supra note 54. Tigar was counsel to the plaintiffs in the Letelier
case.
63. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 665; see also Nash, ContemporaryPractice of

the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 917, 923
(1980) (diplomatic response to threats against Libyan expatriates who opposed
the Qadhafi government); Garvey, Repression of the PoliticalEmigre-The Underground to International Law: A Proposal for Remedy, 90 YALE L.J. 78
(1980).
64. 488 F. Supp. at 665-66; Tigar, supra note 54, at 438-41.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (1982).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1116(b)(3)(A).
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poses support the proposition that the killing of either a diplomat
or a refugee under such circumstances is illegal under international law. It is possible to argue that Letelier was protected
under international law in his capacity as a former ambassador
and as a political refugee. It is a short step from establishing a
breach of international law to claiming that individuals injured by
such a breach have a cause of action.

Whereas the Filartiga family short-circuited any defense of sovereign immunity by suing Pefia-Irala and not the Paraguayan
State, Letelier was an obvious case for the sovereign immunity
defense. Because the bombing took place on United States soil,
however, it was relatively easy to apply section 1605(a)(5), an exception to the general grant of immunity contained in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).6 5 Tigar argues that

67.

See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 49; U.N.
art. 2, para. 4 (use of force); see also agreements cited supra notes 5051. International law plainly contemplates a category of persons entitled to "special protection from any attack on his person, freedom or dignity." Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S.
No. 8532, G. A. Res. 3166, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 146, U.N. Doc. A/
9030, art. 1. The members of this category are not specifically defined in the
Convention. See id. To the extent that the United States includes former ambassadors in 18 U.S.C. § 1116, it arguably acknowledges some sort of international obligation to them (apparently pursuant to customary international law).
Refugees should be in the same position.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 is codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11. Section 1605(a)(5) denies immunity in cases:
not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above [the commercial activity exception],. . . in which money damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of [an
official of] that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment ....
Id. Section 1605(a)(5) also provides a "discretionary act" exception to the exception, based on a comparable provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act. Whatever
a "discretionary act" of a government may be, it is hard to believe that the
definition would include murdering emigr6s. The judge in Letelier agreed. 488 F.
Supp. at 673.
It is an interesting exercise to synthesize the Filartigaand Letelier results.
What would be the outcome if Letelier had found refuge in Mexico and had
been killed in Mexico City instead of Washington, D.C.? In this case, the plaintiff could not use the FSIA or its jurisprudential provisions. Section 1330(a)
provides:
CHARTER
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killing refugees on foreign soil is a tort against the law of nations;
this viewpoint provides both a substantive theory of action and a
basis for jurisdiction in the federal courts. 9 How can the sovereign immunity defense be avoided? Jordan Paust has argued

forcefully that a further exception must be read into the FSIA:
the breach of international law exception.70 This exception strips
a government acting in breach of international law of its jurisdictional immunity. This is an attractive position for those who
might encourage the use of United States courts for human rights
causes.71 This position is problematic, however, in terms of
United States domestic law and international developments.7 2

There is nothing in the current international legal system to preclude a United States court from denying sovereign immunity to
a government in a Filartiga-type case. The absolute immunity

rule has lost its legitimacy, and no clear international rule has
taken its place. Efforts to codify the restrictive immunity doctrine

by international treaty structurally parallel the FSIA's list of specific

exceptions

that

eliminate

the

existence

of implicit

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state
...
as to any claim for relief in personam as to which the foreign state is
not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or
under any applicable international agreement.
There does not appear to be a jurisdictional theory based on the Act in the
absence of one of the Act's exceptions. Jurisdiction based upon some other theory, however, is not precluded.
69. Tigar, supra note 54, at 438-41.
70. Paust, FederalJurisdiction Over ExtraterritorialActs of Terrorism and
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of InternationalLaw Under the FSIA and
the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 232-38. The argument seems to
proceed, in part, on the dubious basis that the term "international agreements,"
as used in the FSIA, includes international custom. See id.
71. See, e.g., R. FALK, THE RoLE OF Doimsmc COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER (1964).
72. The "restrictive" view of sovereign immunity in the FSIA is mainly, although not exclusively, devoted to eliminating the immunity in commercial
cases. It does not purport to be a fundamental attack on the citadel of immunity. The FSIA is a complete codification of those exceptions contemplated by
the legislature. Those not stated would appear to be excluded. See Letelier, 488
F. Supp. at 672. There is, however, nothing in current international doctrine
that affirmatively precludes a United States court from denying immunity to a
government sued in a Filartiga-typecase. See Berman & Clark, State Terrorism: Disappearances,13 RUTGERs L.J. 531, 570 (1982).
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exceptions.73
4
Amy Young-Anawaty's thoughtful contribution to the volume
discusses a complaint filed with the Organization of American
States Commission on Human Rights concerning United States
treatment of Haitian refugees. Her focus is on the use of regional

human rights procedures to deal with refugee problems. She
argues:
The HaitianRefugee case tests for the first time in the Western
Hemisphere the use of an international forum for protecting the
rights of refugees. The complaint alleges not only violations of the
right of nonrefoulement, but violations of other basic rights essential for a fair determination of refugee status in compliance with
international law, and stands as a challenge to the refugee policy
and practices of the country currently receiving the highest num75
ber of refugees in the world.
It is difficult to ascertain the degree of influence the Commission's intervention will have on this ongoing saga. The actions of
the UNHCR 7 have brought some dissatisfaction, which partially
explains why the complaint was filed with the OAS.
David Scott Nance's chapter" records another international
human rights procedure that has been utilized by refugees. International law has steadfastly refused to recognize a "right" to asylum; the European Convention is appropriately tight-lipped on

73. See Berman & Clark, supra note 72. For specific treaty regimes, examine
European Convention on State Immunity of 1972, Europ. T.S. No. 74, reprinted
in 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972) (lists numerous exceptions to the basic principle of immunity); International Law Association Draft for a Convention on State Immunity, 22 I.L.M. 287 (1982) (exceptions drawn in the spirit of the FSIA); InterAmerican Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity for States, id. at 292
(contains a narrower list of exceptions that appear to exclude expansive ones).
74. Young-Anawaty, supra note 55.
75. Id. at 456 (footnotes omitted).
76. Critics of the UNHCR in the nongovernmental human rights community
believed that the Office was simply not forceful enough either in pressing individual Haitian cases with the United States Government or in objecting to the
outrageous procedures being used to "process" those cases en masse. Although
the news media did not report the event, the OAS Commission on Human
Rights visited some of the Haitian detention centers within the United States
and probably had some impact on alleviating oppressive conditions therein. The
case discussed by Ms. Young-Anawaty is noteworthy both because the target
was the United States, not some authoritarian regime, and because some concrete steps were taken on behalf of the refugees.
77. Nance, supra note 55.
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the matter. Nevertheless, in a line of decisions since 1961, the European Commission on Human Rights has recognized a limited
right of asylum by an expansive interpretation of article 3 of the
Convention. This provision asserts that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."78 Nance states that "the Commission has advanced the
principle that a state party violates its Article 3 obligations when
it returns an alien to a country where he or she might be subjected to treatment which, if inflicted by a party to the Convention, would itself constitute a violation of Article 3. ''1o
We are certain to see many such creative uses of international
human rights procedures to assist refugees in the coming years.
Such efforts do not suggest that the UNHCR is somehow being
superseded; it is merely being complemented. The Michigan
Yearbook presents the various aspects involved in the international refugee problem, and I strongly commend this very stimulating collection of articles.

78. Id. at 477 (quoting the European Convention, supra note 39, art. 3).
79. Nance, supra note 55, at 477 (footnote omitted).

